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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Pl(l.in.tiff aud Respondent, 
vs. 
RICHARD JESSUP, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CASE 
No. 6193 
Brief of Defendant and Appellant 
STATEMENT 
In this action the respondent, a resident of New 
Harmony, Washington County, Utah, was tried he-
fore a jury and convicted of cohabiting with more than 
one person of the opposite sex. The evidence showed· 
that defendant lived on a ranch, fifty yards or so froni 
his brother's residence; that his wife Ida Johnson ,J es-
sup is a cousin of Lola Johnson and also of Mary Car-
ling. On September 2, 1939, the day of the arrest, Mary 
Carling was visiting her cousin Lydia at the Fred 
Jessup home ; and she stated that Lola Johnson was 
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visiting at the defendant's home, being a cousin of Mrs. 
Richard Jessup; and that Lola, who was pregnant, had 
be,en there for the two weeks that she, Mary Carling, 
had been there. 
When the Sheriff and his deputy arrested the de-
fendant they saw Mrs. Jessup at the home, also Lola 
Johnson; and on the way to St. George the defendant 
told them that they were being persecuted for the same 
things their fathers had done, and that they believed in 
living according to the laws of God. 
No further testimony was offered; both sides rested; 
the defendant moved for a directed verdict, and, upon 
its denial, the case was submitted to the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERRORS NOS. 1, 4, 5 AND 10 
'The Court erred in overruling defendant's motion to 
quash the information for the reason: 
A. The information fails to state or charge a pub-
lic offense. 
B. Section 103-51-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, as amended by Chapter 112, Laws of Utah, 1935, 
is: 
1. Unconstitutional for the reason: 
a. It violates the Utah Constitution 
(Art. 6, Sec. 23) providing that "no bill 
shall be passed containing more than one sub-
ject.'' 
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b. Tbe title of the Act dol's not l'·OnH· 
all its subjects. 
c. It combines a criminal with n ci \'i 1 
statute. 
d. It is incon8istent with 105-:!1-:m and 
105-~1-40 Compiled Laws of Utah, 1~l:~:J, as 
amended by Chap. 118, Laws of Utah, 1~l:35, 
both of which were passed on the same date 
and bec.ame effectiYe on the same date as 
the statute in question. 
e. It nolates Article 1, Sec. 12 of the 
rtah Constitution, which proYides that "a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against 
her husband." 
f. It nolates Article 1, Sec. 12 of the 
"Ltah Constitution, which proYides that ''the 
aceused shall not be compelled to give eVI-
oonce against himself." 
2. The said section fails to set forth, de-
scribe or define a crime. 
C. The information fails to comply with Sec. 105-
21-8, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1933, as amended by 
Chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 1935. 
A. 
The information (Abs. 2) charged: "That the said 
Richard Jessup on or about the first day of September, 
1939, at Washington County, State of Utah, did cohabit 
with more than one person of the opposite sex". (Italics 
mine). The ancient Greeks expected their legislators 
ooemolia bazein-to talk words of wind-but their final 
enactments to make sense. To cohabit with more than 
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one person of the opposite sex. (L. cohabitare-to dwell) 
could mean to dwell with one's brothers, sisters, or even 
one's children; for there is no crime of cohabitation at 
common law, and even the statutes apply descriptive 
terms to it to make it so. "It is purely statutory, and it 
is a new offense in our statutes." (U. S. vs. Cannon, 4 
Utah 130). As the statute reads a woman may be guilty 
by dwelling with her brothers, sons or other relatives; 
a man, by dwelling with his sisters, daughters, or other 
relatives; a little boy, by dwelling with his sisters; a 
little girl, by dwelling with her brothers. It even sug-
gests polyandry, a practice known to the Tibetans and 
the N airs, but exotic here. As the statute stands, there-
fore, it is nonsense, as the word ''cohabit'' alone is of 
innocent connotation. As has been well said: 
''in order to give it proper effect in any case re-
gard must be had to the subject matter to which 
it relates, to the situation and conditions in re-
spect to which it is used, and to the explanatory 
and qualifying language accompanying it.'' 
14 c. J. s. 1311. 
King v. U. S., 17 F. 2d 61. 
De Berry v. De Berry, 177 S. E. 440, 115 
W.Va. 604. 
State v. Lawrence, 27 N. W. 126, 19 Neb. 307. 
There is no qualifying or explanatory language in the 
statute, though other states, in giving criminal import 
to the word apparently deem adjectives essential; thus: 
"cohabit as man and wife" (Le Blanc v. Yawn, 126 
So. 789, 99 Fla. 328); "cohabit with any other woman" 
(State v. Connaway, Tapp. 58-0hio) : ''lewdly and las-
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civiously associate and cohabit together" (Johnson v. 
Com., 146 S. E. 28~), 152 Yn. 9t15 ), or lewdly and lascivi-
ously cohabit' {State Y. Tutti~. 150 A. 4~)0, 12~) Me.125), 
or "open and notorious illicit cohabitation" {King v. 
U. S., 17 F. 2d 545), '"cohabiting as husband and wife" 
(In re Boyington, 137 K. w·. ~)±~), 157 Iowa 4u7) and 
"cohabiting in a state of adultery" (Martin v. State, 165 
N. E. 763, 89 Ind. App. 107). A statutory absurdity is 
ipso facto a nullity; and this one is nonz.i·ni.s umbra--the 
mere shadow of the name of a crime. vV e can see no 
basis for holding that the legislature in this instance 
set forth, described or defined a crime. 
B1a 
Section 103-51-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 
as amended by Chap. 112, Laws of Utah, 1935, under 
which the information was drawn, is unconstitutional 
for the reason that it violates the Utah Constitution 
(Art. 6, Sec. 23) providing that "no bill shall be passed 
containing more than one subject." The statute in reality 
contains four subjects: 1. Cohabitation; 2. compelling 
any person to testify; 3. using evidence in civil or crim-
inal proceedings; and, 4. liability to prosecution for giv-
ing testimony. ·The statute r::ads as follows: 
"103-51-2 - Unlawful Cohabitation. All 
Persons Except Defendant Must Testify. If any 
person cohabits with more than one person of 
the opposite sex, such person is guilty of a fel-
ony. 
Any person, except the defendant, may be 
compelled to testify in a prosecution for unlaw-
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ful cohabitation; provided, howev·er, that the evi-
dence given in such prosecution shall not be 
used against him in any proceeding, civil or 
criminal, ·except for perjury in giving such tes-
timony. A person so testifying shall not there-
after be liable to indictment, prosecution, or 
punishment for the offense concerning which 
such testimony was given.'' 
The rule against two subjects in enactments is man-
datory in "nearly all jurisdictions" (59 Corpus Juris 
797), and such statutes are "void" (59 C. J. 799). In 
fact as stated in Utah State Fair v. Green, 68 Utah 251, 
concerning such a statute, ''every provision thereof is 
unconstitutional and void", and it should ~be determined 
by the court without ''reference to economic or moral ef-
fect.'' 
The Statute amends Sec. 103-51-2, Compiled Laws 
of Utah, 1933, on Unlawful Cohabitation, which appears 
under Chapter 51 of the Penal Code entitled "Sexual 
Offenses.'' There was nothing in Sec. 103-51-2 about 
compelling witnesses to testify-that was added by the 
1935 amendments, and was really an amendment of Sec. 
105-45-6 of Chapter 45, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1933, on 
"Witnesses and Evidence", particularly concerning the 
testimony of a witness not to be used against him. The 
sections should have been amended sepavately, and thus 
a crime would not have been intermingled with testimony, 
and immunities, civil and criminal, and prosecution aids. 
Again it was a case of the legislature's covering too 
much territory. 
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Blb 
The title of the Act under which the infonuntion was 
drawn does not express all of the subjects, as required 
by Art. 6, Sec. 23 of the Constitution of Utah. rrhe 
title (Chap. 112, Laws of Utah, 1935, rends: 
"An Act Amending Section 10:~-51-~, Re-
nsed Statutes of rtnh, 1933, Making Unlawful 
Cohabitation a Felony, and Providing that all 
persons Except the Defendant Must Testify in 
Proceedings Therefor.'' 
In the title there are two subjects: (a) unlawful co-
habitation, and (b) all persons must testify; whereas in 
the act there are four subjects: (a) unlawful cohabita-
tion; (b) all persons must testify; (c) evidence may not 
be used against witness; (d) non-liability to prosecution 
for offense on which testimony given. 
It is said: 
"All parts of an act which are not within 
its title are unconstitutional and void.'' 
59 c. J. 812. 
Utah Fair v. Green, 68 Utah 251. 
The word ''civil'' in the second paragraph of the 
act enlarges the scope of the act greatly, taking it from 
the criminal to the civil fisld, yet no mention of any 
civil procedure effect is mentioned in the title or, for 
that matter, even indicated.. 
B 1 c 
The preceding paragraph points out another defect 
in the act; it combines a criminal with a ·civil statute. As 
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stated in State v. Tieman, 32 Wash. 294, 73 P. 375, 98 
Am. St. Rep. 854, a statute entitled one relative to 
crimes and punishments and criminal proceedings can-
not lawfully contain any provisions of a civil nature. 
B1d 
The Act is inconsistent with Sec. 105-21-39 and 105-
21-40, Revised Laws of Utah, 1933, as amended by Chap-
ter 118, Laws of Utah, 1935, both of which were passed 
on the same date .and became effective on the same date 
as the statute in question. Thus the cohabitation act was 
passed on March 14, 1935, and was made effective on 
:May 14, 1935; the inconsistent acts were passed on 
March 14, 1935, and made effective on May 14, 1935. The 
cohabitation act exempts ''any person'' from prosecu-
tion for testifying against the defendant even though he 
be particeps crimin·is whereas the other two sections 
(105-21-39 and 105-21-40 as amended by Chapter 118, 
Laws of Utah, 1935) provide : 
''Every person concerned in the .commission 
of an offense, whether he directly commits the 
offense, or procures, counsels, aids or ahets in its 
commission even though not present, shall be 
informed ·against or indicted and tried and pun-
ished as a principal.'' 
''An accessory may be prosecuted, tried and 
punished, though the principal may fbe neither 
prosecuted nor tried, and though the prin.cipal 
may have been acquitted." 
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B 1 e 
The Act also violates Article 1, Sec. 12, of the Utnh 
Constitution which provides that ''a wife shnll not be 
compelled to testify agaim~t her husband." It will be 
noted that the Act reads : '' ~\ny person, except t hP de-
fendant, may be compelled to testify in a prosecution 
for unlawful cohabitation", and, of course, "any per-
son" includes the defendant's wife. It is so apparent 
that the Act is unconstitutional in this respect that it 
is unnec-essary to argue it, even for emphasis. lt is 
obviously, positively and unequivocally unconstitutional. 
B1d 
In similar fashion the Act disregards the Utah 
Constitutional provision (Art. 1, Sec. 12) and the fifth 
amendment of the Constitution of the United States pro-
viding that "the accused shall not :be compelled to give 
evidence against himself.'' Unlawful cohabitation in-
volves dwelling with more than one woman, hence in 
a properly drawn information using names (herein la-
ter discussed) it is inevitable that there be an "accused" 
other than the defendant. The very nature of the crime 
includes a particeps criminis, an accomplice. The stat-
ute compells that other one to testify against herself, 
thus violating the constitutional provision. N emo tene-
tur seipsum accusare is a highly respectoo maxim of 
the common law, not lightly to be disregarded; and, 
while immunity from prosecution might be granted in 
State courts it in no way affects Federal prosecution nor 
mitigates the public disgrace of self-incrimination. 
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c. 
The information fails to comply with Sec. 105-21-8, 
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1933, as .amended by Chap. 118, 
Laws of Utah, 1935. The section provides that an in-
formation may charge: 
'' (a) By using the name given to the offens.e 
by the common law or by statute. 
(b) By stating so much of the definition of 
the offense, either in terms of the common law 
or of the statute defining the offense' or in terms 
of substantially the same meaning, as is suffi-
cient to give the Court and the defendant notice 
of what offense is intended to be charged." 
I hope it is not contended by anyone that the ref-
ormation of criminal procedure as set forth in Chap. 118, 
Laws of Utah, 1935, authorizes such abstract charging 
of public offenses as: ''John Doe committed murder''; 
"John Doe committed robbery", and so on throughout 
the category of crimes-by merely naming them. Such 
chargings are meaningless ; they disregard a corpus de-
licti, and are just as inane as hanging a man because he 
says he committed murder when no one has been killed. 
Nevertheless that is what the information does in this 
case-it points to nothingness. 
''1Did cohabit with more than one person of 
the opposite sex.'' 
Those are the words. What persons? How did he 
"eohabit "-as brother with sister, or as man .and wife? 
Even in the ''Forms for Certain Offenses'' (Sec. 
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103-21-47 a.s amended by Chap. 118, Laws of Utnh, 
1935 ), pei~nitting the charging: of certain crime~ by IUUJl-
ing them, there is always au object; tlms, "A. B. a~­
sault~:l C. D.", ....... \. B. committt'd bigamy with C. D.", 
"A. B. murdered C. D.", and so on. It would han' bePn 
thought ridiculous to say merely •• A. B. assaultL•d ", "A. 
B. committed bigamy", .. A. B. murdered", etc. 'fhe 
statute did not ineludt> "unlawful cohabitation" in the 
category of short forms; even if it had, it would likely 
have set forth: "A. B. cohabited with C. D. and E. 14'. 
as man and wife.'' The information, therefore, is an ab-
straction, a nullity. That such a defect is regarded as 
fatal is set forth in L"nited States v. Cannon, 4 Utah 131 
as follows: 
''If the indictment had charged the defendant 
with 'cohabiting with more than one woman', 
without grnng the names of the womt•n 
without time and place, it would have been in-
sufficient in not giving particulars, so as to enable 
defendant to make proper defense, or to plead the 
judgment hereafter." 
Also at page 130 it is said: 
''To the general rule of describing statutory 
offenses in the language of the statute there are 
exceptions, the principal ones being (1) when the 
statute makes that an offense which was an of-
fense at common law, and (2) when the offense 
is described in the statute in terms too general.'' 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 2, ;) 
The Court erred in overruling defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict, for the reason that the evidence 
is insufficient to justify or sustain the verdict. The evi-
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dence merely amounts to this: At the defendant's home 
his wife was being visited by her cousin who was preg-
nant, and the ·Cousin had been there for two weeks. 
(Trans. p. 8 et seq.) Is there anything criminal about 
that~ The scholarly exegesis of corpus delicti in State v. 
Johnson, 95 Utah 572, has application here, except that 
in the instant case we have no confession to deal with. 
Nearly every home-owner in the country, from the Presi-
dent down, has at some time or other a female relative 
visiting the home, probably enceinte as often as other-
Wise. 
The jury perhaps cogitated on the basis of a pre-
sumption of guilt or on the theory that the defendant 
would not have been arrested unless guilty. They were 
not out long enough to read the instructions, for they 
were back with their verdict while the Court still sat on 
the bench merely discussing the next day's calendar, a 
matter of five minutes. Conviction by rumor an:d local 
atmosphere was denounced in the last of the early co-
habitation cases to reach the existing Utah reports. Thus 
in State v. Graham, 23 Utah 278 (290) the Court said: 
''the defendant could only be convicted upon 
proof of affirmativ·e acts upon his part from 
which the jury might infer guilt. But it would be 
setting a dangerous precedent to permit the mere 
belief or thought of acquaintances and neighbors 
and friends to become an element in any crime." 
The Court in another place (p. 288) very aptly made 
an observation that is most pertinent here: 
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"This is so upon the \n•U-estnbli~IH'd rult' 
that the law presumes a usual nnd ordinary ~tntP 
of thino·s ratht•r than a peculiar nnd t'Xl'Pptiounl conditi~n·; it supposes legality rntlwr thnn erintl'; 
and virtue and nwrality ratlwr thnn thl• opposite 
qualities. '' 
..... \.pplying that rule to the instant e<1se \H' find that 
the law presumes that the defendant's wifl' 's cou~iu 
was nsiting the home lawfully, in the usual manner, for 
the usual purpose; and there is nothing in the e,·idence 
to the contrary. 
Another thing: this cnme of cohabitation-if in-
deed it really exists at all; for adultery au<l bigamy 
apparently take c.are of e\ery unlawful situation-is a 
continuing thing not to be pro\ed by a single visit of 
the sheriff, or a single obseiTation of anyone else. 
The term cohabit ''imports a dwelling togeth-
er for some period of time and does not include 
mere nsits or journeys.'' 
14 c. J. s. 1311. 
In re :Millers Estate, 78 P. 2d 819 (Okla.) 
Turney v. State, 29 S. \V. 893, 60 Ark. 259. 
Jackson v. State, 19 K. E. 330, 116 Ind. 465. 
Calef v. Calef, 54 11e. 365, 92 Am. Dec. 549. 
State v. Connoway, Tapp, 58 (Ohio). 
The term "cohabiting" carries with it the 
idea of a fixed residenc2 rather than that of a 
transient or single unlawful interview.'' 
14 c. J. s. 1311. 
In re Mills, 70 P. 91, 137 Cal. 298, 92 Am. 
St. Rep. 175. 
Comm. v. Calef, 10 Mass. 153. 
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''It has been said that cohabitation is not a 
sojourn, nor a habit of visiting nor even remain-
ing with for a time, but that the term implies cmt-
tinuity." 
14 C. J. S. 1312. 
In re W ray's Est. 19 P. 2d 1051 ; 93 Mont. 
525. 
All that the sheriff saw was that a lady besides the 
the wife of defendant was at the house the day of his 
visit (Trans. p. 19); and the State's first witness tes-
tified (Trans. p. 8) the lady was the defendant's wife's 
cousin. To argue that such evidence-and that is all 
there was to it-proved .a crime must presume upon the 
time of the Court, and should not be pursued further. 
ASSIGNMENT NO. 6 
When counsel for the State asked a witness if she 
was acquainted with "Lola Johnson, sometimes called 
Lola Jessup'' he involved, in his question evidence that 
did not exist. (Trans. p. 11) No one had testified that 
Lola Johnson was known also as Lola Jessup; and, of 
course, this error greatly harmed the defendant in his 
rights. 
ASSIGNMENTS NOS. 7 AND 9 
Likewise, when the Court permitted questions con-
cerning the whereabouts of per~ons twenty days after 
the arrest (Trans. p. 16) it illegally prejudiced the de-
fendant in the minds of the jury. In United States v. 
Cannon, 4 Utah 152, the Court said: 
"They must confine their investigation of his 
guilt or innocence to the proof of facts and cir-
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cumstnnces occurring between the dntes." (Al-
leged in the indictment). 
In criminal c~1ses the rule of exclusion is even 
more important than in ci,·il eases (Lightfoot v. People, 
16 Mic.h. 501, 511). 
A.SSIGXMEXT XO. 8 
The Court erred. in admitting testimony conct.~rn­
ing the pregnant condition of Lola Johnson (Trans. p. 
17) because her eondition was entirely immaterial. 
(L"nited States '· Cannon, 4 rtah 122. 
For the many reasons herein stated, we can see 
no escape from the conclusion that the judgment should 
be re\ersed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLAlJDE T. BARNES, 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appella!nt. 
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